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Abstract
The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which
have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the
desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect
equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit
of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s
desire to exact revenge). The authors construct examples where the equilibrium
is such that the self-deterrence effect paradoxically outweighs the value effect
and thereby decreases the factions’ aggregate effort below the level exerted in the
no-revenge case. This paradox of revenge is more likely, the more elastically the
benefit of revenge reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asym-
metric is the conflict. The authors discuss the implications of revenge-dependent
preferences for welfare economics, evolutionary stability, and their strategic value
as commitment devices.
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If it will feed nothing else, it will feed my revenge.
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (Shylock act III)
Revenge is profitable.
Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (chap XI)
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The desire for revenge appears to be a common human trait. As Elster (1990, 862)
observes ‘‘[R]evenge—the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffer-
ing upon those who have made one suffer, because they made one suffer—is a uni-
versal phenomenon.’’1 De Quervain et al. (2004) found that the striatum, a key
subcortical brain structure involved in feeling satisfaction, was activated in human
volunteers subjected to positron emission tomography (PET) imaging as they played
a game designed to elicit acts of revenge (see also Knutson 2004). Moreover, in pre-
industrial societies, revenge was seen as an integral part of justice and retribution.
This still persists in certain societies. Indeed, some people justify capital punishment
on the grounds that someone who has taken another human being’s life deserves
to have his life taken (i.e., an eye for an eye). See, for example, Nussbaum (1999,
157-58) for a discussion.
Revenge is often seen as a major cause of continuing conflict over and beyond the
original cause of the conflict (see, e.g., Chagnon 1988; Kim and Smith 1993; Juah
2002). Even more, it is sometimes argued that the desire for revenge may completely
destabilize a conflict since an action by one faction is countered by an action of the
other faction, which is again countered by the first faction and so on. Each faction in
the conflict may want to ‘‘throw the last punch.’’ Hence, so the argument goes,
revenge may lead to escalation of the conflict with dramatic or even devastating con-
sequences for all factions. For example, commenting on the notoriously famous and
bloody nineteenth-century feud along the Kentucky–West Virginia backcountry
involving the families of the Hatfields and McCoys,2 Frank (1988, 1) observed that
‘‘[T]o this day, no one is sure how it actually started. But once underway, its pattern
was one of alternating attacks, each a retaliation for the preceding, and thus also the
provocation for the one to follow.’’
The interesting point of this article is that, in contrast to the above arguments, the
desire for seeking revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. Paradoxically,
revenge itself even may be a reason why the conflict is less destructive. We consider
a two-period game of conflict between two factions competing over a given
resource. Each faction has a desire to exact revenge for past destruction suffered.
The benefit of exacting revenge in period 2 is increasing in the destructive efforts
suffered in period 1. If in period 2 a faction wins the conflict, it gets utility from
exacting revenge. Hence, in our model the desire for revenge is understood as a
‘‘prize-enhancing’’ phenomenon.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of this conflict game is characterized by
two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a
self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge).We con-
struct examples where the equilibrium is such that the self-deterrence effect paradoxi-
cally outweighs the value effect and thereby decreases the factions’ aggregate effort
below the level exerted in the no-revenge case. This is what we call the paradox of
revenge because the desire for retaliation reduces the aggregate cost of the conflict.
We show that the paradox is more likely, the more elastically the benefit of revenge
reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asymmetric is the conflict.
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Our paradox of revenge result is important. Revenge is often seen as amajor desta-
bilizing element in conflicts. The consequences are expected to be dramatic for the
factions with a total loss of human life and property. Our results show that this may
not be true, but that revenge itself may be a reason why conflicts are stabilized. Such
a resultmay help explainwhy devastating conflicts eventually become stabilized even
though it is known that the factions have a desire for retaliation. A good example may
be the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland. After a long time of
action and counteraction, today the effort levels of the two factions are rather low, and
the conflict seems to be almost resolved. Of course, there may be other reasons for the
resolution of the conflict (e.g., third-party intervention, faction asymmetries), but the
self-deterrence effect identified in our analysis may also contribute to the explanation
of this observation, in particular since we show that this effect is the more important,
the more asymmetric is the conflict. A similar line of reasoning may be applied to
the end of the cold war between the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
countries and the members of the Warsaw Pact during the nineties.
The preceding point implies that revenge plays a role analogous to tit-for-tat stra-
tegies in repeated prisoner dilemma type games insofar the desire to exact revenge
(i.e., punishment) may lead to socially desirable or cooperative outcomes. However,
a key difference between tit-for-tat strategy and exacting revenge (as modeled in this
article) is that in tit-for-tat, the player who retaliates does not derive utility from the
revenge per se. He only derives a positive utility if his retaliatory action causes his
opponent to cooperate in the future. Hence, tit-for-tat—as modeled in repeated
games—is forward-looking3 while exacting revenge—as modeled in this article and
in reality—is backward-looking.4 This distinction is akin to the legal and philosophi-
cal discussions of punishment for the purpose of deterrence and reform vis-a`-vis
punishment for the purpose of atonement (justice). It is the basis of the legal debate
on the merits of retributive justice vis-a`-vis restorative justice. This difference in per-
spectives explains why some South Africans were not satisfied with the mandate and
job of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission5 in postapartheid South Africa.
Since in our model the desire for seeking revenge is motivated by the past, it goes
against economists’ intuition of letting bygones be bygones. In standard economics,
it is usually argued that sunk costs should not matter. However, in reality sunk costs
matter.6 And one such example is the desire to exact revenge. This desire may stem
from preferences that reflect loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). For
example, in a war, one may want to exact revenge because not doing so is tanta-
mount to losing the war (McAfee, Hugo, and Mialon 2010).
There is, of course, a literature that studies the conditions under which conflicts
escalate or end. Examples are Nalebuff (1986), Fearon (1994), Carlson (1995),
Bester and Konrad (2005), Konrad and Kovenock (2005), and Hausken (2008).
Carment and Rowlands (1998); Siqueira (2003); Chang, Joel, and Sanders (2007);
and Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007) examine third-party intervention in conflicts.
Garfinkel and Skarpedas (2000) study how conflict can arise in a world of complete
information, and Skaperdas (1992) investigated the conditions for peace and conflict
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in world with no property rights. But none of these studies has focused on the role of
a desire for revenge.7
The article is organized as follows. The next section presents a two-period
game of a conflict between two factions that have a desire for revenge. As a
benchmark, we then derive the equilibrium in the case where the factions do not
obtain a benefit from retaliation. Thereafter, the subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the game with revenge is characterized. The final sections discuss the results and
conclude.
A Model of Revenge in Conflicts
Consider two factions in a two-period conflict (war). The time index is t ¼ 1, 2 and
we use j, k¼ 1, 2 as faction indices, where j 6¼ k if not stated otherwise. The original
cause of the conflict is a given resource. For example, in the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, the resource may be land that is used for settlements. The factions compete
for this resource in period 1 and whoever wins the resource in this period keeps it.
However, in period 2, the factions could engage in conflict to exact revenge for atro-
cities suffered in period 1. The game ends after period 2.8
Denote the effort that faction j expends in order to win the conflict in period t by
xjt. The cost of exerting this effort is linear and we normalize the unit cost to one, so
cost of effort equals effort xjt itself. Faction j values the resource in the first period by
Vj. Faction j’s value of revenge in period 2 is given by Rjðxk1Þ where
Rjðxk1Þ > 0; if xk1 > 0; 1
Rjðxk1Þ ¼ 0; if xk1 ¼ 0; 2
R
0
jðxk1Þ > 0: 3
Equation (1) means that faction j has a positive valuation for revenge, if the previous
destruction of its property and human life caused by the other faction k is positive.
According to equation (2), the valuation is zero, if there has not been any loss of
human lives or property. Equation (3) states that the higher the previous destruction
suffered, the higher the value of revenge.9
The probability that faction j wins the conflict in period t is given by the contest
success function
Pjt ¼
x
Z
jt
x
Z
jt þ xZkt
: 4
Equation (4) represents the standard Tullock contest success function frequently
used in conflict models. The parameter Z > 0 reflects the discriminatory power of
the contest. It shows how sensitive the winning probabilities of the factions react
to changes in effort levels.
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Equilibrium without Revenge
As a benchmark we consider the case without revenge. If there is no revenge
then, given our assumptions, there will be conflict in period 1 but not in period 2.
Thus, faction j’s equilibrium effort in period 2 and total equilibrium effort in period 2
are given by
~xj2 ¼ 0; ~X 2 ¼ ~xj2 þ ~xk2 ¼ 0; 5
where the tilde indicates the equilibrium in case without revenge. The payoff of fac-
tion j in period 1 can be written as
pj1 ¼
x
Z
j1
x
Z
j1 þ xZk1
Vj  xj1: 6
Faction jmaximizes equation (6) with respect to effort xj1 taken as given xk1. Differ-
entiating gives the first- and second-order conditions
dpj1
dxj1
¼ Zx
Z1
j1 x
Z
k1
ðxZj1 þ xZk1Þ2
Vj  1 ¼ 0; 7
d2pj1
dx2j1
¼ ZVjxZ2j1 xZk1
ðZ 1ÞxZk1  ðZþ 1ÞxZj1
ðxZj1 þ xZk1Þ3
< 0: 8
Solving condition (7) and the corresponding condition for faction k with respect to
the xj1 and xk1 gives the equilibrium first period effort levels
10
~xj1 ¼
ZVZþ1j V
Z
k
ðVZj þ VZk Þ2
; ~X 1 ¼ ~xj1 þ ~xk1 ¼
ZVZj V
Z
k ðVj þ VkÞ
ðVZj þ VZk Þ2
: 9
The equilibrium aggregate effort exacted by the two faction in both periods is
obtained from equations (5) and (9) as
~X ¼ ~X 1 þ ~X 2 ¼
ZVZj V
Z
k ðVj þ VkÞ
ðVZj þ VZk Þ2
: 10
This expression will serve as benchmark when we now turn to the case with
revenge.
Equilibrium with Revenge
If the factions are motivated by a desire for revenge, there is conflict in the first and
second period. In order to ensure a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, we work
backward by solving the game in period 2 conditional on xj1 and xk1 having been
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exerted in period 1 by the two factions. In period 2, faction j chooses xj2 to maximize
its payoff
pj2 ¼
x
Z
j2
x
Z
j2 þ xZk2
Rjðxk1Þ  xj2: 11
The period 2 conflict described by equation (11) is structurally equivalent to the
period 1 conflict in the absence of revenge described in the previous section by
equation (6). We only have to change the time index from 1 to 2 and replace the
valuation Vj by the benefit of revenge Rj(xk1). Hence, the first- and second-order
conditions for the maximization of equation (11) are immediately obtained from
their counterparts in equations (7) and (8). Similar to equation (9), the first-
order conditions yield the equilibrium second period effort of faction j and the
equilibrium second period total effort as
x^j2 ¼ ZRjðxk1Þ
Zþ1
Rkðxj1ÞZ
½Rjðxk1ÞZ þ Rkðxj1ÞZ2
; 12
X^ 2 ¼ x^j2 þ x^k2 ¼ ZRjðxk1Þ
Z
Rkðxj1ÞZ½Rjðxk1Þ þ Rkðxj1Þ
½Rjðxk1ÞZ þ Rkðxj1ÞZ2
; 13
where the hat denotes equilibrium values when the factions have a desire for revenge.
Equation (12) already indicates the value effect of revenge. When the factions
do not have a desire for revenge, we know from equation (5) that the second period
effort is zero. In contrast, a positive benefit from exacting revenge renders the
second period effort levels of both factions positive according to equation (12).
Formally, Rj ¼ Rk ¼ 0 implies xj2 ¼ xk2 ¼ 0, whereas for Rj > 0 and Rk > 0 we obtain
xj2 > 0 and xk2 > 0.
Inserting equation (12) into equation (11) gives faction j’s second period equili-
brium payoff as a function of the first period effort levels; that is,
p^j2 ¼ Rjðxk1Þ
2Zþ1 þ ð1 ZÞRjðxK1ÞZþ1Rkðxj1ÞZ
½Rjðxk1ÞZ þ Rkðxj1ÞZ2
: 14
For the analysis to follow, we need to know the impact of faction j’s first period
effort on faction j’s second period equilibrium payoff. Differentiating equation (14)
gives
dp^j2
dxj1
¼ ZR
Zþ1
j R
Z1
k R
0
k ½ð1þ ZÞRZj þ ð1 ZÞRZk 
½RZj þ RZk 3
< 0; 15
where, for notational convenience, we suppressed the arguments of the revenge
functions. The sign of equation (15) follows from ð1þ ZÞRZj þ ð1 ZÞRZk < 0
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which, in turn, follows from the second-order condition of the maximization of
equation (11).11 According to equation (15), an increase in faction j’s first period
effort reduces this faction’s second period payoff. The intuition is that, because of
the desire of revenge, faction k fights harder in the second period conflict when
faction j invests more effort in the initial first period conflict over the resource.
This property is the basis for the self-deterrence effect which we will derive in the
following.
We are now in the position to analyze the period 1 conflict. Faction j chooses xj1
to maximize the present value of its payoff from both periods given by
pj1 ¼
x
Z
j1
x
Z
j1 þ xZk1
Vj þ p^j2  xj1: 16
The first-order condition of this maximization problem reads12
dpj1
dxj1
¼ Zx
Z1
j1 x
Z
k1
ðxZj1 þ xZk1Þ2
Vj þ dp^j2
dxj1
 1 ¼ 0: 17
The decisive difference to the corresponding condition (7) in the absence of revenge
is the second term in equation (17). According to equation (15), this new term is
always negative. Thus, when the factions have a desire for revenge, the derivative
in equation (17), evaluated at the equilibrium of the no-revenge case, is negative.
Hence, each faction’s effort in period 1 is lower when there is revenge than when
there is no revenge. Anticipating that its effort in period 1 will cause faction k to
exact revenge in period 2 induces faction j to reduce its effort in the conflict over
the resource. This is the self-deterrence effect of revenge.
In sum, we have shown so far that the desire for revenge causes two effects that
are not present in the no-revenge case: the value effect represented by equation (12)
and the self-deterrence effect represented by the second term in equation (17). These
two effects have opposing impact on the aggregate effort spent by both factions in
both periods.When the value effect outweighs the self-deterrence effect, total effort
of the factions will be higher in the revenge case than in the no-revenge case. This
is the basic notion that revenge will escalate the conflict. However, if the self-
deterrence effect is stronger than the value effect, then revenge will paradoxically
render the conflict less destructive. This is what we call the paradox of revenge in
conflicts.
In order to present examples where the paradox emerges and to investigate
the causes of the paradox, we now consider a number of special cases. Let us start
with the perfectly symmetric case where both factions have the same valuation Vj ¼
V and the same isoelastic revenge function Rjðxk1Þ ¼ Rðxk1Þ ¼ axyk1 with a > 0 and
with y > 0 representing the elasticity of one faction’s benefit of revenge with respect
to the other faction’s first period effort. Denoting aggregate effort spent by both fac-
tions in both periods in the presence of revenge by X^ , we can prove
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Proposition 1: Suppose Vj ¼ V and Rjðxk1Þ ¼ Rðxk1Þ ¼ axyk1 with a > 0 and y > 0.
Then X^
<¼
>
~X if and only if y
>¼
<
1 .
Proof: Note first that for Vj ¼ V and Rjðxk1Þ ¼ Rðxk1Þ ¼ axyk1 we have a sym-
metric equilibrium with x^j1 ¼ x^1. Equations (13) and (15) then reduce to
X^ 2 ¼ Zax^
y
1
2
;
dp^j2
dxj1
¼ Zayx^
y1
1
4
:
Inserting the second expression into equation (17) and rearranging gives the implicit
solution for the first period equilibrium effort level
x^1 ¼ ZV
4
 Zayx^
y
1
4
:
The total effort in case of revenge can therefore be written as
X^ ¼ 2x^1 þ X^ 2 ¼ ZV
2
þ ð1 yÞZax^
y
1
2
:
Comparing this expression with ~X ¼ ZV=2 , which follows from equation (10) and
Vj ¼ V immediately proves the proposition. (Q.E.D.)
Proposition 1 states that in the fully symmetric conflict the paradox of revenge
emerges if the relationship between the benefit of revenge and the previous destructive
effort of one’s enemy is elastic (y>1). In contrast, for an inelastic relationship (y<1) the
desire for revenge escalates the conflict, whereas revenge is neutral with respect to
aggregate effort in case of a unit elasticity (y¼ 1). These results have a strong economic
intuition, since the self-deterrence effect is positively correlatedwith the elasticity of the
benefit of revenge. In the elastic range (y > 1) one faction’s benefit of revenge increases
overproportionally if past destruction of its enemy is raised. Hence, the faction has a
strong incentive to strike back in the second period conflict. This, in turn, gives the
enemy a strong incentive to lower first period effort and to avoid retaliation, so the
self-deterrence effect is relatively strong and overcompensates the value effect. This
argument is reversed in the inelastic range (y < 1), and for unit elasticity the self-
deterrence effect and the value effect just neutralize each other.
Interestingly, the insights obtained by Proposition 1 are independent of the
discriminatory power Z of the conflict. That means that, under the conditions of
Proposition 1, the exact shape of the contest success function is irrelevant for the
question whether the paradox of revenge emerges or not. The reason is as follows.
The discriminatory power Z influences the effort spent in the conflict, indeed. The
higher Z, the more sensitive are the factions’ winning probabilities with respect to
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changes in effort and, thus, the more effort is spent by the factions in equilibrium.
However, this is true both in the presence and in the absence of revenge. Hence,
in both cases, a change in the discriminatory power Z changes total effort in the same
way. The comparison of aggregate effort in the two cases is therefore independent
of Z. Motivated by this property we set Z ¼ 1 in the rest of the analysis.
Next we turn to the impact of faction asymmetries on the paradox result. There are
basically two sources of asymmetries: the valuation of the resource and the benefit from
exacting revenge. Let us start with differences in the benefit of revenge. In order to iso-
late the role of such asymmetries, we set the elasticity of the benefit from exacting
revenge equal to one (y ¼ 1). Hence, according to Proposition 1, starting from a fully
symmetric conflict means that we start in a situation where the aggregate effort is the
samewith andwithout revenge.Then, introducingdifferences in the benefits of revenge
allows us to find out whether such asymmetries make the paradox more or less likely.
Formally, suppose Vj ¼ V and Rjðxk1Þ ¼ ajxk1 with aj 6¼ ak . We then obtain
Proposition 2: Suppose Z ¼ 1, Vj ¼ V and Rjðxk1Þ ¼ ajxk1 with aj 6¼ ak . Then
X^ < ~X .
Proof: Equations (13) and (15) can now be written as
X^ 2 ¼ ajx^k1ak x^j1ajx^k1 þ ak x^j1 ;
dp^j2
dxj1
¼  2aka
3
j x^
3
k1
ðajx^k1 þ ak x^j1Þ3
:
Putting the second expression into the first-order condition (17) shows that
aj 6¼ ak implies x^j1 6¼ x^k1 , since otherwise we obtain a contradiction. Rearranging
equation (17) yields the implicit solutions for the first period equilibrium effort
levels; that is,
x^j1 ¼ x^j1x^k1Vðx^j1þ x^k1Þ2
 2ak x^j1a
3
j x^
3
k1
ðajx^k1þak x^j1Þ3
; x^k1 ¼ x^j1x^k1Vðx^j1þ x^k1Þ2
 2ajx^k1a
3
k x^
3
j1
ðajx^k1þak x^j1Þ3
:
Aggregate effort in case of revenge is
X^ ¼ x^j1 þ x^k1 þ X^ 2 ¼ 2x^j1x^k1Vðx^j1 þ x^k1Þ2
 ak x^j1ajx^k1ðajx^k1  ak x^j1Þ
2
ðajx^k1 þ ak x^j1Þ3
:
Equation (10) and Vj ¼ V imply ~X ¼ V=2 . Hence, X^ < ~X if and only if
ðx^j1  x^k1Þ
2
V
2ðx^j1 þ x^k1Þ2
 ak x^j1ajx^k1ðajx^k1  ak x^j1Þ
2
ðajx^k1 þ ak x^j1Þ3
< 0:
This condition is always satisfied. (Q.E.D.)
Proposition 2 shows that asymmetries in the benefits from exacting revenge make
the paradox result more likely. To illustrate the rationale of this result, suppose we
start in a fully symmetric situation and then increase the benefit of revenge for one
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faction and decrease it for the other faction. In the symmetric situation, the value effect
and the self-deterrence effect just neutralize each other for both factions. Rendering
the factions different then raises the value effect for the faction with high benefit of
revenge and reduces the value effect for the faction with low benefit of revenge.
The self-deterrence effect changes in the other direction. It becomes stronger for the
low-benefit faction and weaker for the high-benefit faction. Overall, the low-benefit
faction will therefore reduce its effort, while the high-benefit faction will increase it.
But the change in the low-benefit faction’s effort dominates that in the high-benefit
faction’s effort, so aggregate effort falls and we obtain the paradox of revenge.13
Finally, we consider asymmetries in the factions’ valuations of the resource.
To abstract from the mechanism already identified in Propositions 1 and 2, suppose
a common linear revenge benefit Rjðxk1Þ ¼ Rðxk1Þ ¼ xk1. Furthermore, we still focus
on the case Z¼ 1. But the resource valuations, Vj and Vk, are now different. We then
obtain
Proposition 3: Suppose Z ¼ 1, Vj 6¼ Vk and Rjðxk1Þ ¼ Rðxk1Þ ¼ xk1. Then
X^ < ~X .
Proof: Equations (13) and (15) reduce to
X^ 2 ¼ x^j1x^k1
x^k1 þ x^j1 ;
dp^j2
dxj1
¼  2x^
3
k1
ðx^k1 þ x^j1Þ3
:
Inserting the second expression into equation (17) and rearranging gives
x^j1 ¼ x^j1x^k1Vjðx^j1 þ x^k1Þ2
 2x^j1x^
3
k1
ðx^k1 þ x^j1Þ3
;
x^k1 ¼ x^j1x^k1Vkðx^j1 þ x^k1Þ2
 2x^k1x^
3
j1
ðx^k1 þ x^j1Þ3
.
Aggregate effort in the presence of revenge therefore amounts to
X^ ¼ x^j1 þ x^k1 þ X^ 2 ¼ x^j1x^k1ðVj þ VkÞðx^j1 þ x^k1Þ2
 x^j1x^k1ðx^k1  x^j1Þ
2
ðx^k1 þ x^j1Þ3
:
From equation (10), we obtain aggregate effort in the absence of revenge as
~X ¼ VjVk
Vj þ Vk :
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Hence, X^ < ~X if and only if
ðx^j1Vj  x^k1VkÞðx^k1Vj  x^j1VkÞ
Vj þ Vk 
x^j1x^k1ðx^k1  x^j1Þ2
x^k1 þ x^j1 < 0: 18
Without loss of generality, suppose Vj > Vk . From the above implicit solutions for
x^j1 and x^k1 it is straightforward to show
x^j1  x^k1 ¼ x^j1x^k1ðVj  VkÞ
x^2j1 þ x^2k1
:
Moreover, from the implicit solutions we also obtain
x^k1Vj  x^j1Vk ¼
2ðx^3k1  x^3j1Þ
x^j1 þ x^k1 :
Hence,Vj > Vk implies x^j1 > x^k1 , x^j1Vj > x^k1Vk , and x^k1Vj < x^j1Vk , so equation (18)
is satisfied and we obtain X^ < ~X . (Q.E.D.)
According to Proposition 3, asymmetries in the valuation of the resource also
make the paradox of revenge more likely. To understand the rationale of this insight,
suppose again we start in the fully symmetric situation and then increase the valua-
tion of one faction and decrease the valuation of the other faction. In the symmetric
situation, the value effect and the deterrence effect just neutralize each other for both
factions. Increasing the valuation of one faction then ceteris paribus gives this high-
valuation faction the incentive to raise first period effort. This makes both the value
effect of the low-valuation faction and the self-deterrence effect of the high-
valuation faction stronger. By the same argument, reducing the valuation of the
low-valuation faction lowers both the value effect of the high-valuation faction and
the self-deterrence effect of the low-valuation faction. Overall, the low-valuation
faction increases its total effort, while the high-valuation faction reduces it. Since
the latter effect dominates, we obtain the paradox of revenge.
Discussion of Assumptions and Results
Arguably, our model omits several aspects of revenge in real world conflicts. For
example, our framework implicitly assumes that a faction obtains a benefit from
revenge only if it is successful in the conflict. In real-world conflicts, a benefit from
revenge may also accrue to the loser of the conflict. But this effect can easily be inte-
grated in our model without changing the main insights. To see this, assume that fac-
tion j’s benefit of revenge is Rjðxk1Þ if it wins the conflict in period 2 and gRjðxk1Þ
with g < 1 if it loses the conflict in period 2. The latter event occurs with probability
1–Pj2. The condition g < 1 means that the value of revenge is lower if the faction
loses the conflict than if it wins the conflicts, which seems to be a plausible assump-
tion. This formulation does not change the result that a faction’s equilibrium payoff
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in period 2 is increasing in its opponent’s period 1 effort or is decreasing in its own
period 1 effort (i.e., the self-deterrence effect). Furthermore, one may also argue that
our model ignores the fact that destruction by one faction imposes a direct cost on
the other faction. Such a direct cost may be incorporated in our analysis by subtract-
ing from the benefit of faction j the term bxjt in period t with b > 0. However, while
these extensions will alter the details of the analysis, they will not change our main
insight that the desire for revenge could lead to a reduction in aggregate efforts in the
conflict by causing a self-deterrence effect.
One may object to the way we have modeled revenge on the grounds that it is
tantamount to arguing that the factions in our conflict have masochistic preferences
in the sense that they derive satisfaction from being hurt. This is a tricky issue which
is akin to the problem of doing welfare economics in behavioral economics. Neither
faction derives satisfaction from suffering destruction. Such destruction is clearly a
cost to them. However, given that destruction has been suffered in the past, the vic-
tim derives satisfaction from exacting revenge. Having a preference for revenge is
like having intransitive or time-inconsistent preferences where an action which was
a cost in period t becomes a benefit in period tþ 1. Arguably, there are other ways of
doing welfare economics when agents have intransitive preferences, although a gen-
eral consensus is yet to emerge on this issue (see, e.g., Carmichael and MacLeod
2006; Bernheim and Rangel 2007, 2009).
Our paradox of revenge result can be given an evolutionary interpretation in the
sense that revenge may have evolved because it enhances evolutionary fitness and
therefore evolved equilibria will be those in which our paradox holds. This point
is consistent with Frank (1988). To be sure, revenge, being a commitment device,
can improve a player’s payoff (Schelling 1960; Crawford 1982).14 To see this, sup-
pose faction 1 has a desire to exact revenge but faction 2 does not have such a desire.
Then faction 1 is not subject to a self-deterrence effect since faction 2 has no desire
to exact revenge. So, all things being equal, faction 1 will increase its effort relative
to the no-revenge case. In contrast, faction 2 is subject to a deterrence effect but has
no desire for revenge. So, all things being equal, faction 2 will decrease its effort
relative to the no-revenge case. Then using each faction’s material payoff to repre-
sent his evolutionary fitness,15 intuitively it holds that faction 1 has a higher material
payoff than faction 2.
Historical narratives of the atrocities of one group against another, while useful as
a way of understanding the past, may also have the undesirable effect of increasing
the cost of conflict because they increase the benefit of exacting revenge (i.e., a) or
make the benefit of revenge too sensitive to atrocities suffered (i.e., elastic). This is
especially true between groups with a history of conflict such as the Israelis and
Palestinians, the Serbs and Croats, and the Hutus and Tutsis. Such stories may be
distorted in order to promote hatred toward one’s opponents. Glaeser (2005) presents
a nonconflict model of such ‘‘entrepreneurs of hate’’ or hate-mongering. He argues
that policies intended to promote integration including intermarriages will tend to
make such stories ineffective since these forms of interaction make it easier to verify
324 Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(2)
the truth. However, there is no incomplete information in our model, so stories about
past atrocities need not be distorted. However, their continual repetition across gen-
erations with the goal of promoting hatred is enough to maintain or increase the util-
ity from exacting revenge or decrease the rate at which past destruction is forgotten.
In contrast, reconstruction assistance such as those given to Lebanon after the 1975–
1990 war may help in increasing the rate at which past destruction is forgotten,
although memories of the destruction of human lives is unlikely to be affected by
such reconstruction assistance.
In repeated games, it is well known that socially desirable or cooperative outcomes
can be sustained by using punishments such as trigger (grim) strategies. However,
some of these forms of punishment that support cooperation are not immune to rene-
gotiation and so are not credible. Following Farrell and Maskin (1989) and Bernheim
and Ray (1989), there is now a literature that focuses on renegotiation-proof equilibria
in repeated games. Renegotiation-proofness is an equilibrium refinement that usually
narrows the set of subgame-perfect equilibria in a dynamic game. It is interesting to
note that since revenge is part of a player’s preferences (i.e., he or she derives utility
from exacting revenge), it is a credible threat and so punishing one’s opponent is not a
Pareto-dominated action. It follows that our paradox of revenge result is not only
socially desirable but also renegotiation proof. A revenge-induced equilibrium is not
robust to renegotiation only if the preferences of the players can be changed. It may
well be that if mediators appeal to the conscience of warring factions and encourage
them to lay down their arms, they may be trying to moderate their desire for revenge,
so that the players would look to the future instead of the past.
Finally, one might want to know the implication of the desire of revenge for the
bargaining between the factions. Since revenge adds an additional benefit of success
to the factions, it means that in the presence of revenge bigger transfers are required
to compensate a faction in bargaining. This is because you have to compensate a fac-
tion for two reasons: (1) to give up whatever concessions it may demand (e.g., part of
piece of land) and (2) to dissuade it from exacting revenge in order to obtain the ben-
efit thereof. This is likely to imply that the probability of a breakdown in bargaining
(no agreement) is higher in the presence of revenge. Anticipating that it is harder to
compensate someone who has a desire of revenge may reinforce our paradox result
because it means that a faction may try to minimize its opponent’s benefit for
revenge in order to increase the chances of reaching an agreement in bargaining.16
Conclusion
In this article, we have investigated the implications of the desire for revenge for the
dynamics of conflicts. We modeled revenge as a prize-enhancing phenomenon
where the utility from exacting revenge is increasing in the stock of past destruction.
Surprisingly, it turned out that revenge, understood in this sense, need not destabilize
the conflict, but on the contrary may itself be a reason why the social cost of conflict
may be lowered.
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Given that the factions in our model derive satisfaction from exacting revenge,
there is no guarantee that the effect of the fear of retaliation (i.e., self-deterrence
effect) will be strong enough to outweigh the benefit of exacting revenge (i.e., value
effect) resulting in a lower level of destruction relative to the case without revenge.
We have constructed examples to show that this is possible. In doing so, we showed
that the nature of the benefit of revenge and asymmetries between the factions
matter.
We hope that our work has shed some light on our understanding of the effect of
revenge on the dynamics of conflict and will lead to further work in this area. For
example, an interesting but very challenging extension is to explain why some
groups may be more revenge-driven than others? How should welfare economics
be undertaken for parties who have a desire for exacting revenge? Should a third
party’s intervention decision be different when warring factions have a desire to seek
revenge relative to when they do not have such a desire? We leave the analysis of
such questions for future research.
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Notes
1. Hume (1898, appendix II) notes that ‘‘[W]ho see not that vengeance, from the force alone
of passion, may be so eagerly pursued as to make us knowingly neglect every consider-
ation of ease, interest, and safety and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls
into the wounds we give an enemy.’’
2. See Rice (1982) for an account of the Hatfield-McCoy’s almost forty-year feud.
3. Commenting on the attractiveness of tit-for-tat, Axelrod (1984, 54) observed that
‘‘[W]hat accounts for tit-for-tat robust success is its combination of being nice, retalia-
tory, forgiving, and clear. Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble.
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Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried. Its
forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation. And its clarity makes it intelligible to the
other player, thereby eliciting long-term co-operation.’’ For a critique of this far-
reaching claim, see Martinez-Coll and Hirshleifer (1991) and Binmore (1998).
4. As we argue in our concluding remarks, our revenge equilibrium is renegotiation-proof.
5. The official government Web page of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion is www.doj.gov.za/trc/. The report of the commission is available at www.info.gov.
za/otherdocs/2003/trc/.
6. See the examples in McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon (2010) and the references therein.
7. Jaeger and Paserman (2008) undertake an empirical analysis of response to violence in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike economists, the role of revenge in wars, conflicts,
and social relationships has been studied by philosophers, legal scholars, political scientists,
and psychologists. Examples are the works of Chagnon (1988), Elster (1990), Stuckless
and Goranson (1992), Kim and Smith (1993), Suny (1993), Bloom (2001), Juah
(2002), Knutson (2004), and Orth (2004).
8. This is the simplest time structure in which we can make our point. It may be argued that
there should be a further fight over the resource itself in period 2. In an earlier version of this
article, we showed within a full dynamic infinite horizon differential game framework that
the paradox result may also occur when in each time period the factions fight for both the
resource and the benefit from exacting revenge. See Amegashie and Runkel (2008). The
advantage of our simple two-period framework is that we can give the model much more
structure and thereby gain more analytical insights on the determinants of the paradox
results. The differential game approach, in contrast, is restricted to numerical simulations.
9. It is important to note that the positive value of revenge does not reflect masochistic pre-
ferences. A faction does not derive satisfaction from suffering destruction. Destruction is
costly to the victim. However, given that destruction has been suffered in the past, the
victim derives satisfaction from exacting revenge.
10. These results coincide with those derived by Nti (1999), who was the first to investigate
the asymmetric contest model of the type considered here, but within a one-period frame-
work without revenge.
11. Remember that this second-order condition is obtained by changing the time index from 1
to 2 and replacing Vj by Rj in equation (8). Using the equilibrium solution (12) in the
resulting expression proves our statement.
12. We suppose an interior solution to the factions’ maximization problems and, thus, an inte-
rior equilibrium. This requires that the second-order conditions are satisfied and that the
payoffs of the factions in the equilibrium are nonnegative. While the complexity of the
model does not allow a general proof, for each case considered in the following we are
able to construct examples where these conditions are really satisfied. Moreover, numer-
ical simulations show that the examples are not pathological. Details on the computations
can be obtained upon request. Put differently, to ensure an interior equilibrium the set of
parameter constellations has to be restricted, but the restricted set is not empty.
13. The result obtained in Proposition 2 is a variant of the property inherent in many asym-
metric contest models according to which a more unequal playing field reduces aggregate
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effort spent in the contest (e.g., Nti 1999). Note, however, that previous studies did not
take into account the desire for revenge and, thus, the story of their results is not based
on the value and self-deterrence effect, in contrast to our story.
14. The idea that emotion-based punishment is credible and can improve welfare has been
experimentally confirmed by Fehr and Gaechter (2000).
15. Using material payoffs implies that we ignore the benefit from exacting revenge and only
include the cost of effort and the expected benefit of obtaining the material benefit V > 0
in a player’s payoff. That the fitness function need not be the same as the players’ payoffs
in the game is a standard approach in the indirect evolutionary approach pioneered by
Gueth and Yaari (1992). In the indirect evolutionary approach, evolutionary forces do not
directly work on actions as in Smith (1974) but on preferences. Hence, for a given
preference, the equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium and not Evolutionarily Stable
Strategies (ESS). See also Gueth and Napel (2006), Ely and Yilankaya (2001), and Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) for applications of the indirect evolutionary approach.
16. A thorough analysis of this point will require a formal two-period model of conflict with
revenge where the parties have the option of bargaining in period 2 before conflict takes
place. To take into account the breakdown in bargaining will require a model of incom-
plete information. If one does not want to do that, then instead our paradox result will hold
not because of a breakdown in bargaining since with complete information, we can find
an equilibrium with immediate agreement but instead a faction will reduce its effort in
period 1 in order to reduce its opponent’s disagreement payoff in the bargaining game
and hence increase its payoff in the second period bargaining game.
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